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Abstract. The paper examines a significant phenomenon overlooked by the trade literature:
internationally regulated goods. Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific
goods, such as drugs, small arms, and antiquities, have come under increasing international
control in recent decades through a set of global regulatory agreements. I argue that these goods
are unique in that they involve transnational negative externalities. Whereas certain countries
benefit from the trade in these goods, the trade inflicts negative effects on other countries.
Examples of such negative externalities include fatalities and refugee flows resulting from
rampant gun violence, high crime rates associated with widespread drug abuse, and
archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting. The paper develops a theory that first
explains why national regulation is insufficient and why international regulation is necessary for
curbing these negative externalities. The theory then analyzes why certain governments are
strongly in favor of international regulation while others wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled.
My analysis locates the sources of governments’ conflicting preferences in the domestic political
arena and considers how exporters, consumers, and civil society shape governments’ views. The
final part of the theory examines how the distribution of state power affects the establishment of
the regulatory agreements. The paper makes several theoretical contributions by bridging
rationalist and non-rationalist accounts of international law and by focusing on international
cooperation in the absence of shared interest.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant developments in international law in recent decades has been the
proliferation of agreements on trade liberalization. 1 Through the various agreements, most
notably those constituting the WTO, governments have dramatically lowered trade barriers and
thereby encouraged and facilitated trade.2 Scholars of International law and political economy
have focused much attention on the move to freer trade. They have carefully examined the
origins and implications of countries’ choice to “integrate their economies into a global one by
See, for example, Edward Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of
Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements,
57 INT’L ORG. 829 (2003).
2
See, for example, Judith Goldstein et al., Institutions in International Relations: Understanding
the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. 37 (2007).

1

2

dismantling protectionist barriers.”3 Indeed, the literature suggests that world trade has been
moving invariably in one direction, toward greater liberalization and openness. I argue,
however, that this conventional wisdom has overlooked a distinct trend that runs in the
opposite direction. While world trade in general has indeed become more free in recent
decades, trade in specific goods has become more controlled and significantly less free. From
drugs to antiquities to diamonds and small arms, states have increasingly restricted and regulated
commercial transactions involving a rapidly growing list of goods. They have done so through a
set of global regulatory agreements, which established – rather than dismantled – obstacles to
trade. The purpose of these agreements is to reduce the negative externalities for society
resulting from free trade in these goods, such as crime associated with widespread drug abuse;
archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting; the financing of rebel military
campaigns through the sale of diamonds; and rampant gun violence caused by the proliferation
of small arms.
This paper examines the overlooked counter-trend of international trade regulation. It
offers a theory of internationally regulated goods (IRGs) that explains why certain goods are
regulated internationally; how governments form their preferences on international regulation;
and how they establish cooperation. The paper argues that international regulation allows
governments to make up for the deficiencies of national regulation by imposing controls on the
externalities-generating countries. Two groups of governments therefore support international
regulation: governments facing the trade’s negative externalities upon their own countries and
governments concerned about the trade’s negative effects on foreign countries. The latter may
3

Helen Milner & Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in
the Developing Countries, 59 INT’L ORG. 107 (2005). On the world trading system see generally
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNTIONAL TRADE (3rd
ed., 2005); Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'’L L.J. 303; JOHN
JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND THE CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006).
3

come to support regulation under pressure from value-motivated groups committed to worldwide
suppression of trade that they deem harmful. Pro-regulation governments, however, meet with
resistance from governments that wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. Those anti-regulation
governments act in the interest of domestic actors who benefit from unregulated trade, such as
arms manufacturers, antiquities dealers and museums, or drug exporters. With little shared
interest among governments, the political conflict over regulation ends in non-cooperation (when
the governments resisting regulation are powerful) or coerced cooperation (when the
governments favoring regulation are powerful).
Beyond identifying and analyzing the overlooked trend of internationally regulated goods,
this paper makes several additional contributions. First, my theoretical model bridges rationalist
and non-rationalist accounts of international law by combining self-interest calculations with
morally-inspired motivations. Governments in my theory respond to material influences, such as
interest group pressure, yet they may also harbor humanitarian-inspired concerns for the welfare
of foreign countries. I introduce the concept of secondary negative externalities to denote such
value-based motivations. This concept allows me to answer puzzling questions such as: Why did
the United States launch a worldwide campaign against human trafficking? Why did the United
States and Britain accept international regulation of antiquities over the objections of antiquities
dealers and museums?
Second, the theory challenges core assumptions of the literature on international law and
cooperation. Going back to Keohane’s After Hegemony, 4 cooperation scholars have typically
taken the existence of mutual gains (or shared interest) as the premise of their analyses. They
first assumed that states can benefit from and have an interest in cooperation; they then
proceeded to examine the conditions under which common interests may lead to cooperation.
ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
4

4

This paper, by contrast, does not take shared interest as given; instead, it focuses on cooperation
in the absence of shared interest. Rather than assume partial convergence of government
preferences, the paper examines how large variation in government preferences can hinder
international cooperation. Moreover, the paper challenges the view of international agreements
as providers of public goods that benefit all. It highlights situations in which international
agreements are detrimental – rather than beneficial – for certain governments.
Third, the theory addresses highly important issue-areas that have received little attention
from scholars of international law and international relations. Consider small arms, for example.
Small arms kill many more people than any other weapon, including WMDs. Small arms are the
weapons of choice in the vast majority of contemporary conflicts and are often used in crime and
terrorism.5 Nevertheless, international regulation of small arms has been merely a footnote in the
literature on arms control.6 My theory sheds lights on international cooperation against small
arms proliferation and misuse; it also illuminates the efforts to curb various other problems
including drug- and human trafficking, conflict diamonds, money laundering and counterfeiting.
All those constitute major threats to international security, the international economy and human
welfare.7
The article is organized as follows. Part II documents the trend of internationally regulated
goods and explains its causes. Part III theorizes government preferences on international
regulation and explains why they vary considerably. Part IV examines how cooperation is
On the effects of small arms proliferation see WENDY CUKIER & VICROR SIDEL, THE GLOBAL
GUN EPIDEMIC: FROM SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS TO AK-47S (2006).
6
David Kinsella, The Black Market in Small Arms: Examining a Social Network, 27 CONTEMP.
SECURITY POL’Y 100 (2006).
7
See, for example, MOISÉS NAÍM, ILLICT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS
ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2006); TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: BUSINESS AS USUAL? (Mats Berdal & Monica Serrano eds., 2002);
CAROLYN NORDSTROM, GLOBAL OUTLAWS: CRIME, MONEY, AND POWER IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD (2007).
5

5

established in light of the conflicting preferences of governments. Part V concludes with
implications for policy and for international law scholarship.

II. WHY INTERNTIONAL REGULATION?
A. Documenting the Trend
The liberalization of markets and world trade is considered one of the most important
economic trends of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War II, trade regimes in
most countries were marked by extensive and often prohibitive trade restrictions. The years since
have seen a growing integration of ever more countries into the world trading system and a
dramatic reduction of barriers to trade. 8 A large body of political economy literature explores the
origins of trade liberalization and advances various explanations for the removal of trade barriers.
Some of these explanations focus on the trade-promoting effects of the GATT/WTO through the
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination or through information provision and dispute
settlement.9 Other lines of research emphasize the contributions to trade liberalization of liberal
policy ideas, US leadership, and the worldwide spread of democracy.10 Whatever the underlying
cause, the political economy literature has emphasized a unidirectional trend of trade
liberalization. In recent decades “countries across the globe have decided to dramatically reduce
their trade barriers and move toward freer trade.”11 A similar focus has also characterized the
8

Milner and Kubota, supra note 3; Beth Simmons et al., Introduction: The International
Diffusion of Liberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 781 (2006).
9
On the GATT/WTO see, Goldstein et al., supra note 2;. JOHN BARTON ET AL., THE
EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME (2006).
10
See, for example, Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT’L
ORG. 179 (1988); Anne Krueger, Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1997); Edward Mansfield et al., Why Democracies Cooperate More:
Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002).
11
Milner and Kubota, supra note 3, at 112.
6

international legal scholarship. Trade law scholars have written extensively on trade
liberalization, especially through GATT/WTO and NAFTA.12
I argue that the focus of the literature on the reduction of trade barriers has missed a
counter-trend.13 Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, the trade in specific goods –
such as drugs, small arms, and antiquities – has come under increasing international control in
recent decades. Rather than liberalizing the trade in these goods, governments have chosen to
subject them to various rules and restrictions. They have done so through a set of cooperative
arrangements, which established – rather than dismantled – obstacles to trade:
•

The international drug regime was established prior to World War I, bolstered after
World War II, and controls the trade in drugs to this day.14

•

Beginning in 1995, the UN has been leading a process intended to regulate the trade in
small arms and light weapons, producing the Program of Action on Small Arms.15

•

International efforts against the trade in persons for sexual exploitation (human
trafficking) originated in the early 20th century and received a boost in recent years under
US leadership.16

See, for example, ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN JACKSON, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (2000); JOSEPH H. H. WEILER (ED.), THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA:
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2000).
13
For a notable exception see Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization: International Law,
Illegal Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH J. INT’L L. 549 (2003).
14
See Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization and International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U J.
INT’L L. & POL. 89 (1999); Thomas, supra note 13; WILLIAM MCALLISTER, DRUG DIPLOMACY
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (2000).
15
Reaching Consensus in New York: The UN 2001 Small Arms Conference, SMALL ARMS
SURVEY 2002 203; DENISE GARCIA, SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMEMGING
INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2006).
16
Linda Smith and Mohamed Mater, Creating International Consensus on Combating
Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy, the Role of the UN, and Global Responses and Challenges,
28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 155 (2004); Janie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff:

12
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•

The 1989 Basel Convention controls the trade in hazardous wastes.17

•

The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention regulate the
international trade in antiquities.18

•

Starting in the 1980s, the international campaign against money laundering has
imposed various controls on financial transactions.19

•

The trade in wildlife is conducted in accordance with the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), adopted in 1973.20

•

Since 2002, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has attempted to ensure the
legitimacy of the diamond trade and stop the trade in conflict diamonds.21

Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437 (2006);
Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human
Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
17
KATHATINA KUMMER, INTERNTIONAL MANAGEMEENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: THE BASEL
CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES (1995); Theodore Waugh, Where Do We Go from
Here: Legal Controls and Future Strategies for Addressing the Transportation of Hazardous
Wastes Across International Borders, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 477 (2000); Kimberly K.
Gregory, The Basel Convention and The International Trade of Hazardous Waste: The Road to
the Destruction of Public Health and the Environment is Paved with Good Intentions, 10
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 80 (2001).
18
PAUL BATOR, THE INTENRTIONAL TRADE IN ART (1982); LYNDEL PROTT, COMMENTARY ON
THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN AND ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS
1995 (1997); PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVNETION ON
ILLICIT TRAFFIC (2000).
19
Money laundering is a service, rather than a good, but exhibits very similar characteristics to
IRGs. Therefore, I include it in my analysis. WILLIAM GILMORE, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNTIONAL MEASURES TO COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM (2004); Beth Simmons, International Efforts against Money Laundering, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 244 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUDEING: A NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL (2000).
20
ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE CITES
TREATY AND COMPLIANCE (2002): John L. Garrison, The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate over Sustainable Use, 12
PACE ENVTL. L. REV 301(1994).
21
Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of
Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 835 (2003); Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling
8

•

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, signed in 2003, aims at reducing
significantly the prevalence of tobacco consumption.22

•

The 1997 Ottawa Convention bans the production, use, and transfer of anti-personnel
landmines.23

•

An optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child bans the sale of child
pornography.24

•

Combating the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is among the purposes of the TRIPS
agreement.25

As of 2008, twelve goods26 have become IRGs – they are subject to international regulation
through a set of 22 global agreements. Table 1 lists all global IRG agreements in force today.27
Note that while most of these agreements take the form of legally-binding instruments, some do

Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to
Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 217 (2005).
22
Benjamin Mason Meier, Breathing Life into the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:
Smoking Cessation and the Right to Health, 5 Yale J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 137 (2005).
23
Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the International NonGovernmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11. EUR. J. INT'L L. 91
(2000); Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and
Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 561 (2003).
24
Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on Sex
Trafficking and Child Soldiers, 9 Hum. Rts. Br. 13 (2001).
25
INTELLECTUAL PROERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (Carlos
Correa and Abdulgawi Yusuf eds., 1998); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000); CARLOS CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007).
26
Human beings are not a “good” in the strict sense, but are treated as such by those involved in
human trafficking, who buy and sell them. In some cases, a regulated good is, in fact, a category
of objects. “Small Arms” are weapons designed for personal use, such as pistols, rifles, and
shotguns. “Counterfeits” may be bags, shoes, shirts, etc.
27
For identifying IRGs I relied primarily on PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN,
POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2006).
9

not (for example, the Program of Action on Small Arms and the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme). What unifies these agreements, however, is their purpose: imposing controls on
specific goods and restricting commercial transactions involving these goods, thereby making the
trade in them more difficult to carry out. Such purpose is the exact opposite of the goal
underlying the WTO and other trade liberalization agreements, which is to lower trade barriers
and facilitate commerce.

Table 1. Global IRG Agreements in Force
Good
Drugs
Drugs
Drugs
Small Arms
Small Arms

Antiquities
Antiquities

Agreement
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs28
Convention on Psychotropic Substances30
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances31
Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects32
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime33
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict34
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of

Year Adopted
196129
1971
1988
2001
2001

1954
1970

Mar. 30, 1961, U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (amended by 1972 Protocol).
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is a consolidation and expansion of several preWorld War II agreements. For the purpose of Figure 1 below I consider 1945 as the year of
adoption.
30
Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175.
31
Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/14 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
493.
32
UN Doc No A/CONF/192/15 (2001).
33
G.A. Res. 383, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/383/Add.2 (2001).
34
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358.

28

29

10

Antiquities
Human Beings
Human Beings
Human Beings
Human Beings

Money Laundering
Money Laundering
Money Laundering
Counterfeit and
Pirated Goods
Hazardous Wastes
Diamonds
Endangered

Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO
Convention)35
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects36
Slavery Convention37
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery38
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others39
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime41
The Forty Recommendations42
United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime43
United Nations Convention against Corruption44
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)45
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal46
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme47
Convention on International Trade in Endangered

1995
1926
1956
194940
2000

1990
2000
2003
1994
1989
2002
1973

Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
June 24, 1995, 34 ILM 1322 (1995).
37
Sept. 25, 1926, T.S. No. 778, 212 U.N.T.S. 17, amended by Protocol Amending the Slavery
Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51.
38
Sept. 7, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
39
Dec. 29, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
40
The 1949 Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons is a consolidation and
expansion of several pre-World War II agreements. For the purpose of Figure 1 below I consider
1945 as the year of adoption.
41
G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000).
42
Available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
accessed Feb. 26, 2008).
43
Nov. 2, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335 (2001).
44
U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Dec. 11, 2003).
45
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
46
March 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125, 28 I.L.M. 657.
47
Available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/.
35
36
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Wildlife and Plants Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)48
Landmines
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction49
Child Pornography Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography50
Tobacco
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control51

1997
2000
2003

Figure 1 contrasts the well-familiar trend of trade liberalization with the overlooked countertrend of trade regulation.
Figure 1. Trade Liberalization and Trade Regulation
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Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
Sept. 18, 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (1997).
50
G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Jan. 18, 2002).
51
WHA Res. 56.1 (May 21, 2003).
48
49
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The downward-sloping line represents the trend that trade scholars have been focusing on: trade
liberalization. The percentage of countries with closed trade policies has dropped from about
90% of all countries back in 1945 to about 20% in 2001.52 Yet at the same time that governments
have liberalized their trade policies, they have also increasingly regulated specific goods through
global international agreements. As the upward-sloping line shows, the number of IRG
agreements has grown steadily since 1945, and has increased precipitously since the mid-1980s.
In addition to the global agreements, some of the goods are also regulated through regional
agreements (for example, OAS Firearms Convention,53 Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings, 54 Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes 55 ); subregional agreements (for example, Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 56 ); and
bilateral agreements (such as US-Mali and US-Nicaragua agreements concerning the imposition
of import restrictions on archaeological material).57 In some cases those agreements preceded the
52

Data on trade policy openness is from KAREN HORN WELCH & ROMAIN WACZIARG, TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND GROWTH: NEW EVIDENCE (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10152, 2003). Their data updates that of Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic
Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 1:1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 1 (1995). A country was classified as closed if it displayed at least one of the following
characteristics: 1. Average tariff rate of 40% or more. 2. Nontariff barriers covering 40% or more
of trade. 3. A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official
exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1908s. 4. A state monopoly on major exports. 5. A
socialist economic system.
53
Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, Nov. 11, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-49
(1998).
54
May 16, 2006, 45 I.L.M. 12.
55
Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773
(1991).
56
Apr. 21, 2004, available at http://www.armsnetafrica.org/eng/resources/pubs/africa/saaf12.pdf
(last accessed Feb. 26, 2008).
57
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of
the Republic of Mali Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Archaeological
Material from Mali from the Paleolithic Era (Stone Age) to Approximately the mid-Eighteenth
13

global ones. For example, regional agreements on small arms in Africa, Latin America, and
Europe led up to the two global agreements. In other cases, the non-global agreements followed
the global ones. For instance, the United States implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention
through bilateral agreements with countries facing archaeological pillage. 58 The theoretical
analysis in this paper focuses on the global regulatory agreements.
The post-WWII trend of growing trade regulation runs counter to the general trend of trade
liberalization, which took place simultaneously. While trade scholars have studied the latter trend,
they have not detected the former. I now turn to an in-depth examination of international trade
regulation and its causes.

B. The Causes of International Regulation
International regulation should be distinguished from national regulation. Governments regulate
many goods on health, safety, and environmental grounds. Such national regulation, however, is
a matter of national discretion and may vary from country to country. In contrast, my focus is on
intergovernmental arrangements that coordinate regulatory practices and set international
standards for controlling certain goods. What does international regulation entail? The regulatory
arrangements vary in the scope of controls they establish. Some of them, such as CITES, focus
on the export and import of IRGs. Yet in others the production of the goods – as well as their
distribution, possession, and use – may be the subject of regulation. The Single Convention on

Century, signed Sep. 19, 1997; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
American and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Imposition of
Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from Mali from the Pre-Hispanic Cultures of the
Republic of Nicaragua, signed June 16, 1999. Agreements are available respectively at
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/ml97agr.html and
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/nifact.html (last accessed Feb. 26, 2008).
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See Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
14

Narcotic Drugs is a case in point. Several arrangements have additional dimensions, such as
raising public awareness and fostering cooperation between law enforcement agencies.59
The stringency of controls exhibits significant variation as well. At the extreme,
international regulation amounts to a total prohibition on the production, trade, or use of the good.
This is the case with human trafficking, child pornography, counterfeits, and landmines.60 For
most goods, however, regulation involves a set of rules, guidelines, and requirements for proper
conduct of the trade, rather than a complete ban. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
requires the Parties to allow the manufacture, trade, and distribution of drugs only under license
and to permit the export of drugs to any country only in accordance with the laws of that
country.61 The Convention also empowers the International Narcotics Control Board to oversee
the international drug trade in order to “limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of
drugs to an adequate amount required by medical and scientific purposes … and to prevent illicit
cultivation, production … and use of, drugs.”62 CITES distinguishes between three categories of
animal and plant species according to the severity of threat of extinction and it establishes
corresponding requirements for export and import permits.63 The Kimberley Process is based on
For example, the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, provisions II.20, II.41, and III.18 address the
raising of awareness to the problems associated with small arms. Article II.27 encourages states
to establish trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law
enforcement, border and customs control agencies.
60
See, for example, Article 3.1(c) to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. The Article requires
states to criminalize “Producing, distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering,
selling or possessing for the above purposes child pornography… .”
61
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Articles 29, 30.
62
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Article 9(4).
63
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of these species is permitted only in exceptional circumstances. Appendix II includes species not
necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid
utilization incompatible with their survival. Appendix III contains species that are protected in at
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standardized certificates that must accompany any international shipment of diamonds, detailing
the identity of the exporter and importer, value of the shipment, and so on. Whether they involve
import and export guidelines, procedures for tracing and recovery, or any other regulatory
measure, the purpose of IRG agreements is to establish uniform standards for the treatment of the
goods. These regulatory arrangements subject the goods to internationally-coordinated rules and
practices and set barriers to their cross-border movement.
Why have governments targeted certain goods with international regulation? I argue that
the motivation for international regulation of goods such as guns and drugs is entirely different
from the typical motivation for trade restrictions: Protection. Typically, the purpose of trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas is to protect the income of certain sectors or industries that are
harmed by trade liberalization. By contrast, I study international regulation aimed at curbing the
negative externalities of uncontrolled trade in specific goods.
While uncontrolled trade in these goods benefits exporters and consumers, the trade also
generates negative externalities, that is harmful effects on society.64 In some cases, society in the
importing countries bears the negative externalities. Free trade in small arms leads to gun
proliferation and higher levels of gun violence in gun-importing countries. Gun violence, in turn,
causes loss of life and injuries; increased costs of medical treatment, policing, and care to
displaced people; destruction of physical infrastructure; refugee flows; disruption of health care
and schooling; and reduction in productivity, tourist streams, and foreign investment. 65 Free
trade in drugs could lead to widespread drug abuse in drug-importing countries, resulting in
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (introducing the
concept of externalities). Externality describes a situation in which “individual's actions have
effects on others which he does not take into account in making his decisions. “ Coase, ibid, p.
23.
65
A Common Tool: Firearms, Violence and Crime, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004 173; Behind the
Numbers: Small Arms and Conflict Deaths, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2005 229; The Instrument
Matters: Assessing the Costs of Small Arms Violence, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006 189; Cukier
& Sidel, supra note 5, ch. 2.
64
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crime, higher health care costs, and lower workforce productivity.66 Certain actors may indeed
welcome the availability of guns and drugs. Illicit drug-users may “benefit” from abundance of
drugs; criminals as well as law-abiding citizens may welcome easy access to guns. But the cost
for society of readily-available drugs and guns is enormous.
Whereas importing countries face the harmful effects of free trade in guns and drugs, in
other cases the exporting countries bear the negative externalities of IRGs. Uncontrolled trade in
antiquities causes looting and destruction of archeological sites in the source countries. 67 By
allowing the sale of “conflict diamonds”, unregulated diamond trade fuels conflict in diamondexporting countries.68 As in the cases of guns and drugs, certain actors benefit from uncontrolled
movement of antiquities and diamonds. Subsistence looters – typically poor peasants – receive
small financial compensation for the antiquities they dig up, and the middlemen who move those
antiquities out of the country and sell them abroad make much larger financial gains. When the
diamond trade is free from control, rebel groups manage to sell diamonds and thereby finance
their military campaigns. For society, however, free trade in diamonds and antiquities means net
loss due to civil wars and archaeological destruction.
Third countries, neither the exporting nor importing countries, may also face the negative
externalities of trade. Uncontrolled trade in small arms threatens not only those countries that are
awash in guns. Neighboring countries feel the effects of gun proliferation as well through
refugee flows and obstruction of commerce, to name just two. Counterfeits are another case in
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point. When country A exports counterfeit goods to country B, the results are lost revenue for the
producer of the original good in country C and the inhibition of future innovation.69
Uncontrolled trade in IRGs can therefore inflict harmful – even devastating – externalities
on society. The purpose of international regulation is to curb the negative externalities that these
goods generate and to minimize any harmful effects from their production, sale, or use. By
regulating the trade in small arms, governments attempt to deny guns to criminals, rebels, and
terrorists while allowing gun possession and use by security forces and law-abiding citizens.
Regulation of the drug trade aims at restricting the use of drugs to medical and scientific
purposes. Controlling the diamond trade enables consumers to purchase and enjoy the precious
stones without inadvertently financing conflicts in Africa. The efforts against money laundering
intend to allow the use of money for any purpose other than crime or terrorism. For conventional
trade, governmental interference through trade barriers causes net loss, whereas trade
liberalization enhances national welfare.70 The reverse is true for IRGs. Free trade in these goods
could be harmful for some societies, and the purpose of international regulation is to reduce such
harm.

C. Why Is National Regulation Insufficient?
If indeed IRGs involve significant negative externalities, governments should combat those
externalities through national regulation. Why is there any need for international regulation?
National regulation is typically the first step in addressing the harmful effects of IRGs, but it
often proves ineffective. Countries in Africa and Latin America impose restrictions on the import
See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2003); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCETIVES (2006).
70
On the economic case for free trade and against protection see THOMAS OATLEY,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTERESTS AND INSTITUTNS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 43-49 (2d ed. 2006).

69

18

and possession of firearms, 71 and yet they suffer from high rates of gun violence. Many
antiquities-rich countries have laws that make all antiquities – including those still unexcavated –
the property of the state. Such laws often prohibit any unauthorized removal and export of
antiquities. 72 Nevertheless, export of antiquities continues uninterrupted, notwithstanding the
prohibiting legislation.
Why are national controls insufficient? There are several causes. First, controls on the
import or export of the goods do not suppress demand. Demand for guns persists despite
restrictions on import and possession; limitations on the export of antiquities do not lessen the
interest of museums and collectors in obtaining them. As long as demand exists, suppliers will
profit from meeting it. Buyers and sellers will therefore attempt to carry on the trade, regardless
of restrictions. The incentives of suppliers to flout national regulation are especially great, since
many of the relevant commercial activities – such as antiquities looting, drug export, and human
trafficking – promise high yield with relatively low-cost investment.73
Second, countries cannot seal their borders completely to prevent the movement of these
goods. Border control, customs, and police forces are never fully effective even in developed
countries, let alone in developing countries where trained and equipped law enforcement
personnel is a scarce resource. Large territory or difficult terrain may also compromise national
control efforts. The larger the territory and the longer the borders, the harder it is to enforce the
law and restrict inflows and outflows of goods. Moreover, restrictions on the trade drive the
prohibited transactions underground. Clandestine commercial activity is, of course, much harder
to trace and suppress. Once drug use or antiquities export are banned, drugs users and antiquities
CUKIER AND SIDEL, supra note 5, ch. 7.
LYNDEL PROTT & PATRICK O’KEEFE, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING
THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1988).
73
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looters attempt to hide from the law and are therefore difficult to control.
Third, national regulation has become increasingly difficult in recent years because of the
growing openness of the global economy.74 Financial and trade liberalization, improvements in
communication and transportation, and the easing of restrictions on cross-border transactions
significantly hamper the ability of states to enforce trade controls and provide greater
opportunities to those who trade in IRGs. For example, the improvement of transportation
infrastructure and distribution networks has facilitated the trade in conventional goods, but has
also eased the cross-border movement of guns. Similarly, the large increase in the volume of
international trade has unintentionally resulted in more places to hide drugs and antiquities and
has lowered the probability of interdiction and seizure.75
What, then, is the purpose of international regulation and how does it augment national
control? The key for understanding international regulation is the variation in the negative
externalities of IRGs and the transnational nature of the externalities, that is, the incongruence
between the countries generating the externalities and the countries bearing the externalities.
I asserted above that IRGs inflict significant negative externalities. However, such
negative externalities differ considerably across countries. While gun violence exists in
virtually any country, the magnitude of the problem varies, from extremely rare
incidents in some countries to everyday occurrences in others. In 2002, Colombia’s gun
homicide rate was 51.8 (per 100,000); the equivalent rate for Egypt in 2000 was merely 0.02.76
Rates of drug abuse also vary cross-nationally. 2.8 percent of the population aged 15-64 in the
United States abuse cocaine – seven times the cocaine abuse rate in Mexico (0.4 percent). The
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rate of opiates abuse in Iran is 2.8 percent; in Japan – only 0.06 percent.77 In other cases, the
externalities are heavy for some countries and nearly non-existent for others. Primarily
industrialized countries bear the costs of trading in counterfeits. Through flows of “conflict
diamonds”, the unregulated trade in diamonds has contributed to civil conflicts in diamondexporting countries such as Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra
Leone. Uncontrolled trade in antiquities has caused major losses in antiquities-rich countries,
among them Mexico, Italy, India, and Mali.78 Developing countries – the dumping ground for
hazardous wastes – are the main victims of uncontrolled waste movement.79
The negative externalities of the trade in IRGs are therefore borne disproportionately by
a subset of countries. Other countries, however, generate these externalities and may actually
gain from the free movement of the goods. Whereas small arms wreak havoc in Africa and Latin
America, China profits from exporting small arms, with annual sales estimated at one hundred
million dollars.80 Britain – the second largest art market in the world – has benefited handsomely
by selling antiquities looted from their countries of origin.81 Pirated and counterfeit goods have
been a source of revenue for countries worldwide, including Russia, Vietnam, and Turkey among
77
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others.82 The negative externalities of IRGs are therefore transnational: the countries generating
the externalities are different from those bearing the externalities. To put it differently, the source
of the externalities is outside the boundaries of those countries that bear the externalities.
The transnational nature of the externalities results in variation of national regulation.
Countries that generate the negative externalities and gain from free trade in these goods take a
permissive approach and establish loose national controls. On the other hand, countries facing
large negative externalities impose strict national control on the goods’ production, possession,
import, or export, as appropriate. As explained above, however, national controls are rarely
fully effective, and at times their impact is no more than marginal. Cross-national variation
in the stringency of regulation between countries of origin and destination abets the trade
and compromises even further the effectiveness of one-sided national controls. Despite its
strict drug laws, the United States is unable to stem the flow of drugs from Mexico if Mexican
authorities do not suppress drug export from their territory. Mexico’s attempts to limit gun
inflows cannot fully succeed due to the ease of gun purchase in the United States.
As negatively-affected countries on their own cannot fully control the trade and
address its externalities, they seek to augment national efforts by strengthening control at
the other end and tackling the externalities at their source. Curbing import of guns is much
easier if the source countries regulate gun export. Outflows of antiquities are less likely to
occur if the market countries control the entry of antiquities. Coordination of national
controls – through international regulation – is therefore a means to overcome the limited
utility of national efforts. International regulation seeks to reduce the trade’s externalities by
narrowing the gaps in national regulation and moving the more permissive countries toward
82
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stricter control. Through international regulation, the externalities-bearing countries attempt to
induce the establishment of restraints by those countries that generate the externalities. The goal
of regulating the international trade in drugs and small arms is to restrain the drug- and armsexporting countries and make them reduce the negative externalities of their exports. The
purpose of regulating the antiquities trade is to put curbs on market countries, so as to reduce the
archeological damage caused by demand from the consumers: art dealers and major auction
houses, museums, and private collectors.
In short, the purpose of international regulation is to fill the gaps in national control and to
converge regulatory practices on the stringent side of the spectrum. By requiring that all states
establish adequate controls, in particular those who generate the externalities, international
regulation aligns state practices in order to curb the negative effects of the goods.

D. Why Not a Coasian Bargaining Solution?
In many contexts, governments address negative externalities by imposing regulation on their
source, such as an air-polluting factory. As explained above, the transnational nature of the
externalities renders this solution inapplicable to IRGs. For IRGs, the source of the externalities
is outside the boundaries of those countries that bear the externalities, and the latter therefore
cannot control the externalities at their source. International regulation augments the national
controls of the externalities-bearing countries by inducing the externalities-generating
countries to establish proper controls.
The Coase Theorem 83 suggests another possible solution to the problem of trade
externalities, which does not involve international regulation. According to Coase, actors facing
negative externalities can reduce or eliminate them by paying off those generating the
83
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externalities. In the absence of transaction costs, the parties should be able to strike a mutually
advantageous bargain. Is this a viable solution for addressing the externalities of the trade in
small arms, drugs, or antiquities? For a variety of reasons, the answer is negative.
At the most general level, some of the conditions essential for Coase’s conclusions to hold,
such as perfect information and zero transaction costs, are not met in world politics. 84
Additionally, the Theorem may not hold in situations that involve many participants. 85 In
addition to these general problems, IRGs raise more specific difficulties that preclude the type of
contracting proposed by Coase. First, financial compensation is simply irrelevant in some cases.
Museums and art collectors are unlikely to accept money as a substitute for antiquities they
would like to purchase. Payment is unlikely to convince governments to eliminate landmines, if
those are considered a military necessity. Second, paying off the actors that generate the
externalities may not be financially feasible. When those bearing the externalities are poor
countries, they may not have the required financial means. For example, African countries that
suffer from rampant gun violence cannot afford to pay off arms-exporting countries to restrict
gun exports. Given the lucrative nature of the drug trade, even rich countries will find an
international regulatory framework cheaper than paying off all illicit drug producers worldwide.
Third, externalities-bearing countries will likely refuse to pay off those who benefit from illegal
acts. Paying off banks to stop laundering the proceeds of crime is not a morally satisfying
solution. Paying off those who export drugs to countries where those drugs are banned is another
bargain likely to be viewed as unjust. Since national regulation is ineffective and a Coasian
contract unlikely, international regulation has become the preferred method for addressing the
negative externalities of trade.
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E. International Regulation in Time
Turning back to Figure 1, why has the number of IRG agreements increased dramatically over
time, particularly since the mid-1980s? I hinted at the answer earlier. The set of processes known
as “Globalization” has to a large extent fueled the trend of growing international regulation. As
Andreas explains,86 overall trade liberalization has provided an effective cover for illicit cargo.
Due to the increase in the volume of international trade, illegal exports and imports have become
harder to detect. With more and more people and goods moving across countries, effective
inspection at borders and ports of entry has become a near impossible task. 87 Privatization,
financial liberalization, and eased restrictions on foreign investment have also had an unintended
impact. Aimed at attracting legitimate foreign capital, these reforms also allow for easier
laundering of crime proceeds.
Transportation improvements have had a dual effect as well. The innovation of
containerization – packaging of goods in sealed, standardized containers – has facilitated the
movement of legal cargo as well as the transport of illicit goods. Drug smugglers into the United
States have indeed exploited the container revolution, which allows them to ship larger amounts
of drugs at a lower cost and lower risk of arrest than alternative methods, such as private planes
or speedboats.88 More generally, the increasing number of transportation routes and the lowering
of transportation prices, while overall a positive development, have made illegal trafficking
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cheaper and easier.89
Finally, economic and political reforms in the 1990s have facilitated illegal cross-border
flows in yet another way. The social and economic disruption resulting from these reforms has
encouraged individuals to turn to the clandestine economy. Agricultural reforms in Mexico and
the drop in farm incomes forced farmers to turn to illicit crops such as marijuana and opium
poppy. Economic hardship in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism forced young women
to become prostitutes abroad, where they fell victim to human trafficking.90
The past twenty years have seen an increase in imports and exports and hence a rise in the
negative externalities of trade. At the same time, states’ abilities to curb these externalities
through national means were diminished. The accumulation of these changes explains the
growing turn to international regulation since the mid-1980s. It is also interesting to note that the
first IRG agreements were adopted at the end of the previous era of globalization. Booming trade,
unprecedented capital flows, and mass migration characterized the period of 1850-1914.91 These
trends led to the signing of the first agreement on human trafficking in 1904 and the conclusion
of the first drug control treaty in 1912.92
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III. GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL REGUALTION
Inspired by the Liberal school of International Relations,93 I argue that governments vary widely
in their preferences on international regulation and that the sharp divergence of government
preferences is the greatest obstacle to international regulation. The key question, then, is how
governments form their preferences on international regulation. Which governments push for
strong international regulation and which prefer weak controls? I begin my analysis with
conventional political economy approaches to trade policy. In trade models,94 the main actors are
industries or sectors, and the principal dimension of political conflict is between exporting
industries and import-competing industries. Exporters, interested in gaining access to foreign
markets, support trade liberalization. Consumers, interested in cheap and available goods, favor
free trade as well. A collective action problem typically prevents consumers from organizing
politically, yet they may influence the government as voters. 95 By contrast, industries facing
import-competition suffer from trade liberalization and support protectionism. Often betterorganized and more politically effective than those who benefit from free trade, importcompeting industries lobby the government to establish trade barriers and protect their
incomes.96
I argue that this understanding of trade policy, while a useful starting point, does not
adequately capture the forming of government preferences on international regulation. The proliberalization side of trade models – influence of exporters and consumers – applies to IRGs as
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well, albeit with some important modifications. But the fundamental difference lies in the antiliberalization side. As Grossman and Helpman indicate by titling their trade policy model
“Protection for Sale”, 97 conventional political economy analysis considers Protection as the
primary purpose of governmental restrictions on trade. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers intend, first
and foremost, to shield import-competing sectors from loss of income due to free trade. With
protection as the cornerstone, existing models do poorly when goods such as guns or drugs are
considered. For these goods, the primary driver of trade restrictions is not protectionist demands
from local industries facing competition; rather, it is the negative externalities of uncontrolled
trade. Centered on protection, existing trade models are therefore unable to capture and explain
IRGs. Conventional models would take into account the interests of exporters and consumers,
who benefit from the trade, but not the broader negative ramifications of the goods for society.
Therefore, their prediction would be free trade in these goods rather than regulation.
Understanding international regulation requires the replacement of protection with negative
externalities as the main impetus for trade restrictions and control.
My analysis first examines the anti-regulation influence of exporters and consumers, who
favor uncontrolled trade. I then consider the pro-regulation influence of the trade’s negative
externalities. My theory distinguishes between primary externalities (the trade’s negative effect
on one’s own country) and secondary externalities (concern about the trade’s effects on foreign
countries).

A. Exporters
In trade policy models, a simple commercial logic guides exporters’ preferences. Exporters are
interested in open markets abroad and oppose any impediments to selling their products. Their
97
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goal is to lower barriers to their goods in foreign markets, whether tariffs, non-tariff barriers such
as quotas, or other types of protection, such as health and safety requirements. This leads
governments, which are interested in exporters’ support, to pursue foreign markets opening and
enhance export opportunities. Securing foreign market access for exporters has therefore been
one of the chief drivers of the move to freer trade. For example, Bailey, et al., as well as
Gilligan,98 conclude that rising exports and increased lobbying by exporters played a major role
in the liberalization of American trade policy after World War II. Exporters’ interests have also
been among the underlying motivations for the GATT/WTO. Bagwell and Staiger argue that “the
WTO is driven by exporter interests” and that “[t]he GATT member governments saw
agreements to reduce tariffs as the most expedient way to increase the access that their exporters
could enjoy to the markets of their trading partners.” 99
To what extent does this logic apply to exporters of IRGs? IRG exporters constitute a
diverse group. They represent various economic sectors and industries: agriculture (narcotic
drugs), services (banking, sex industry), manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, small arms, hazardous
wastes) and natural resources (diamonds). In addition, the exporters vary in their degree of
domestic legality. Exporters are typically legal and legitimate actors at home in cases where the
negative externalities of the trade fall on the importing country (for example, banks in the case of
money laundering; the small arms industry). However, where IRGs impose externalities on the
country of origin, exporters may be illegal actors. Two types of illegality should be distinguished.
Certain exporters are illegal since their IRG-related activity has been banned by national
Michael Bailey et al., The Origins of American Trade Policy: Rules, Coalitions, and
International Politics, 49 WORLD POL. 309 (1997); MICHAEL GILLIGAN, EMPOWERING
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legislation. 100 Antiquities looters are a case in point. Illegality comes from their violation of
national laws prohibiting unauthorized removal and export of archaeological material. Other
exporters are illegal regardless of their engagement in prohibited trade. Rebels’ illegal status
comes from their desire to overthrow the government rather than from the sale of conflict
diamonds.
How does international regulation affect IRG exporters? On the one hand, regulation may
benefit certain exporters through its anti-competitive effects. By limiting the availability of the
goods, regulation may raise their price and allow exporters to reap a regulation premium.101
Various safety and quality regulations can work to the advantage of those exporters already in
compliance, while driving out of the market those unable to comply. Regulation can also be
useful for public image or reputational purposes.102 Exporters wishing to demonstrate their social
responsibility may welcome humanitarian-inspired trade guidelines. More generally, meeting
regulatory requirements may be a certification of product quality.
I argue, however, that for exporters the costs of regulation are likely to outweigh the
benefits. International regulation could result in total prohibition on the trade or ban on certain
transactions; could slow the export process under administrative requirements; and could
increase the costs of production and transfer of the goods. Many countries, for example, would
like to establish international transfer controls for small arms, which would impose restrictions
on arms transfers. Examples include a prohibition on small arms sales to unauthorized non-state

As explained above, such national legislation precedes the efforts for international regulation.
States resort to international regulation when they find their national legislation ineffective.
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actors or a prohibition on selling arms if those might be used for human rights violations.103
From the exporter’s point of view, transfer controls discontinue the practice of selling arms to
any buyer without screening and reduce the likelihood of receiving an export
authorization. Transfer controls, in other words, mean lost income. So does the establishment of
a transparency mechanism for small arms transfers. Certain potential buyers may not be
interested in purchasing arms if the transaction is made public. Moreover, transparency could
result in a more careful scrutiny of requests for license exports and lower rate of approvals by
the authorities of the exporting country. 104 Regulation thus imposes a burden on exporters,
which is likely to be larger than the possible benefits they may reap both in magnitude and
certainty. I therefore expect exporters to regard international regulatory efforts as a threat to their
commercial interests, which trumps any concerns about the negative externalities of the goods.
Interested in maintaining freedom of trade, exporters will likely try to steer the government away
from supporting international regulation. To what extent will they manage to shape the
government’s preference?
Typical impediments to the political involvement of exporters have a smaller effect on the
exporters of the goods addressed here. Exporters, generally speaking, may not always be
interested or willing to act politically due to the uncertainty of economic gain. Exporters may
judge that there are limited gains from new markets or that the costs of lobbying overwhelm the
benefits of trade liberalization. The need to counter pressures from import-competing groups
On transfer controls for small arms see Back to Basics: Transfer Controls in Global
Perspective, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007 117.
104
Some countries release public data on their arms exports, either through a national arms export
report or through customs data reported to UN Comtrade. See Back to the Sources: International
Small Arms Transfers, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004 99, 115-16; Reaching for the Big Picture:
An Update on Small Arms Transfers, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2005 97, 110-113. Such channels,
however, do not constitute a formal transparency device. Certain countries are therefore
interested in a formal transparency mechanism by expanding the UN Register of Conventional
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may also lessen exporters’ enthusiasm to organize politically.105 Such considerations, however,
are less likely to affect the calculations of IRG exporters. International regulation involves a high
certainty of significant loss for exporters that serves as a strong motivation for political action.
Moreover, IRG exporters typically do not need to overcome resistance from import-competing
sectors. As I explain below, opposition to the free-trade preference of exporters may indeed
come from value-motivated actors, such as the NGO-based International Action Network on
Small Arms or environmental groups in the case of hazardous wastes. However, the limited
financial resources and electoral insignificance of these groups make them easier to overcome
than politically influential import-competing industries.
Exporters are therefore likely to lobby the government against international regulation, yet
their ability to shape policy may vary considerably across countries as well as across sectors and
industries. When exporters are few, they are better able to overcome the collective action
problem and organize for political action. 106 Some exporters can provide more political
contributions than others and “buy” the government’s support. The government may cater to the
interests of exporters that provide many jobs or are otherwise important to the economy. Illegal
exporters – such as antiquities looters – do not have standing to influence policy. They may not
be able to lobby the government or may have to resort to illegal means, such as threats.
Another determinant of exporters’ influence is ownership structure, particularly whether
the exporter is state-owned or in private hands. In existing trade policy models, the government
is a target for demands from interest groups and responds to such demands so as to maximize its
chances of staying in power. The government, however, is not an active market actor and has no
commercial interests of its own.107 This is not the case for certain IRGs whose exporters are
105
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state-owned. When this is the case, the government does not merely respond to industry lobbying.
Rather, the government has a direct stake in the trade as a source of revenue. State-owned arms
manufacturers in India, Pakistan, Egypt, and France generate income for their governments. The
sale of opium in China by the East India Company in the 18th and 19th centuries benefited the
British government.108 The Chinese government benefits from the fees charged by state-owned
employment agencies; those fees impose a heavy burden on Chinese migrant workers abroad and
facilitate trafficking in workers.109
Since state-owned exporters are a source of income, governments may be particularly
protective of their interests and hence averse to international regulation. But there may be other
reasons as well. The management of state-owned enterprises is part of the state apparatus. As
“Bureaucrats in Business”,110 state-owned exporters can therefore influence government policy
from within. They often enjoy easy access to, and even close personal ties with, key decision
makers, all making lobbying easier and more effective, compared to privately-owned exporters.
Furthermore, a government’s inclination to support state-owned exporters may come from their
association with goals greater than financial profit, such as national development or security. For
example, state-owned arms exporters are often considered strategic assets with a key role in their
countries’ foreign and security policy.111 State-owned banks in Iran have played an important
Feenstra, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Political Economy Approach, 58 J.
INT’L ECON. 335 (2002). In their model, the profits earned by state-owned firms in China receive
extra weight in the government’s objective function.
108
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1756-1833 (2006).
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TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN ISRAEL 5-6 (2003),
http://www.hotline.org.il/english/pdf/For_you_were_strangers_2nd_edition_Eng.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2008).
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part in the regime’s missile procurement and nuclear programs as well as in funding terrorism.112
Contemporary governments are unlikely to follow the example of Britain, who waged war twice
in the 19th century over its right to sell opium in China. However, I expect governments to show
greater resistance to international regulation when the interests of state-owned exporters are
under threat.

B. Consumers
The political economy literature typically claims that consumers prefer free trade, which allows
them to enjoy cheap imports and raises their real incomes. However, consumers do not shape
trade policy through lobbying. The costs of protectionist trade policy are diffuse, and the severity
of the collective action problem facing consumers makes their lobbying efforts negligible
compared with producers.113 Rather, consumers affect trade policy as voters. Governments lower
trade barriers in order to garner voters’ support in future elections.114
What about IRG consumers? Like exporters, IRG consumers constitute a diverse group. In
some cases, consumers are numerous (recreational drug users and gun owners, for example). In
other cases, their number is relatively small (for instance, museums and private collectors in the
antiquities market). The consumer may be the government itself (small arms)115 or an industry
using the import to produce the final good (diamonds, wildlife). As with exporters, consumers
may be legitimate actors who engage in overall legal activity (museums, diamond industry) but
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY (1992).
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also illegal actors. For some consumers, such as drug users, the illegal status results from
national restrictions on the possession or consumption of the goods. In other cases, however, the
illegal status is independent from the consumption of the goods. Criminals and terrorists are
illegitimate actors regardless of their involvement in money laundering or gun purchasing.
Consumers of IRGs may be interested in the goods for various reasons. Collectors
purchase antiquities because of their aesthetic or historical value; rebels obtain arms to
overthrow the government; counterfeits are cheaper than the original. Whatever the source of
interest in the goods, I assume that most consumers care only about their own welfare and are not
concerned about the negative externalities of the trade. They are interested in unrestricted access
to the goods and oppose international regulation, which would make the goods more expensive,
restrict their availability, or eliminate them completely. A minority of consumers, however, do
take into account the damage caused by uncontrolled trade and may therefore welcome
regulation. Museums in Britain are a case in point. As museums of archaeology, Britain’s
museums are concerned about the destruction of archeological record due to antiquities looting.
Moreover, endowed with few resources, these museums hardly acquire new items and therefore
have no difficulty supporting restrictions on the antiquities trade. By contrast, major US
museums acquire new items on a regular basis, and as museums of art they are less concerned
about archaeological destruction to begin with. Those US museums thus favor antiquities trade
that is not stringently controlled.116 The split within the museum community demonstrates my
See Robert Hallman, Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist
Approach, 12 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 201 (2005). As Hallman explains, the American “museum
community … stands apart from others in its high proportion of private funding and in the
independence and sizeable acquisition budgets that sometimes follows” (ibid, p.207). Whereas
the British Museum announced as early as 1972 that it would not acquire illegally exported
antiquities, the Metropolitan Museum of Art has not accepted an unequivocal ban on acquiring
illegally exported objects (ibid, pp. 209-210). The code of ethics for museums in Britain requires
museums to reject illegally exported objects (Museums Association Code of Ethics for Museums,
Section 5.10); by contrast, the Code of Ethics for Museums of the American Association of
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point. Whereas some consumers may support international regulation, most consumers oppose
regulation.
Despite their objection to international regulation, however, consumers may face
difficulties in organizing for political action. One such difficulty is a collective action problem,
the obstacle for consumer influence emphasized by the trade literature. Another possible
impediment – unique to IRGs – is a pre-existing national ban on consuming the good. Gun
owners and drug users in countries that prohibit civilian gun possession or recreational drug use
may not be able to lobby in pursuit of free trade in small arms or drugs. Since consumption is
already banned nationally, these consumers may find it difficult to shape the government’s
preference on international regulation. Similarly, criminals cannot openly lobby the government
to allow money laundering.
But unlike consumers in trade models, which affect policy only as voters, some IRG
consumers may enjoy political influence other than through voting. Such is the case, for example,
when the government itself is among the consumers. Governments use small arms and landmines
for national security purposes. Certain poor governments have “imported” hazardous wastes, i.e.
consented to the dumping of wastes on their territory in return for hard currency.117 Although
economists have studied the issue of government procurement, 118 conventional trade policy
models do not consider governments to be consumers. For understanding governments’
Museums falls short of advising members to comply with foreign laws regarding export or state
ownership of antiquities (the Code requires museums to ensure that acquisition activities
“discourage[] illicit trade,” but does not define what constitutes illicit trade). The two Codes are
available, respectively, at
http://www.museumsassociation.org/asset_arena/text/cs/code_of_ethics.pdf and http://www.aamus.org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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preferences on international regulation, however, one must take into account situations where
governments themselves consume the goods. By opposing international restrictions, those
governments wish to maintain their ability to obtain the goods and use them.
Another category of politically-active consumers includes industries that use the goods in
the process of production, such as the diamond industry; employers of trafficked migrant
workers; and consumers of antiquities – art dealers, auction houses, and museums. In those cases,
the number of consumers is sufficiently small and the impact of the trade sufficiently
concentrated to overcome the collective action problem and allow consumers to organize in
order to promote their interests. The diamond industry established the World Diamond Council
to enhance its influence on the Kimberley Process and shape the regulatory outcome in line with
the industry’s interests.119 The Association of Art Museum Directors, as well as individual art
museum directors, advocate against stringent regulation of antiquities.120

C. Negative Externalities
Consumers and exporters of IRGs are interested in uncontrolled trade. Uncontrolled trade,
however, generates negative externalities that drive governments’ regulatory efforts. I distinguish
between two types of negative externalities. Countries negatively affected by the trade bear
primary externalities. Countries concerned about the trade’s negative effects on foreign countries
experience secondary externalities.
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1. Primary externalities
Primary externalities are the negative material effects on one’s own country resulting from the
trade. Examples include gun homicide victims, pollution from hazardous wastes, archaeological
destruction caused by antiquities looting, and crime facilitated by money laundering. These
negative effects are felt mainly by the countries of export or consumption, but third countries
may face them as well. For example, gun violence in Africa triggers refugee flows that end up in
Europe.121 Whereas trade models typically equate consumers with the public, in the case of IRGs
the public has distinct preferences from the actual consumers of the goods. As discussed above,
consumers benefit from their use of the goods and favor uncontrolled trade. The public, however,
bears the negative externalities of the goods and is interested in curbing the trade.
Why would the government care about the trade’s negative effects? I assume that the
government’s goal is to survive in power.122 This requires the government, first and foremost, to
address externalities that threaten it directly and undermine its control of society, such as
rampant gun violence or the financing of rebel campaigns through conflict diamonds. The
government may also believe that its political survival depends on aggregate social welfare.
Failure to solve pressing social problems such as gun violence or widespread drug addiction
might result in loss of popular support. Another possibility is that actors negatively affected by
the trade lobby their government to take action. These actors may affect the government’s
survival in power through campaign contributions, for example.123 Governments therefore have

In 2001 Western Europe hosted 1.7 million refugees from other regions. See TIMOTHY
HATTON & JEFFREY WILIIAMSON, REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND POLICY IN EUROPE (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10680, 2004).
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various incentives to try and control the trade in order to reduce its negative effects. I expect
three influences on the government’s level of support for international regulation:
1. Support for international regulation will increase with the magnitude of the negative
externalities. For example, the higher the rate of gun violence or drug addiction, the greater
should be the government’s support for international restraints on the trade in small arms and
drugs. The greater the scale of archaeological looting, the stronger the government’s support for
international control of the antiquities trade.
2. Support for international regulation will increase with the importance attached by the public to
the negative externalities. Antiquities looting and human trafficking, for example, do not meet
with uniform responses. Former colonies, such as India, care deeply about antiquities looting,
which they view as a contemporary form of their exploitation by the West. 124 Israel, an
antiquities-rich country without colonial past, pays far less attention to illicit antiquities. Publics
committed to human rights find human trafficking an abhorrent phenomenon that must be
uprooted; others find the trade in persons an acceptable practice. Different publics may therefore
exhibit different levels of concern about the trade’s externalities. The government’s support for
international regulation will vary accordingly.
3. Support for international regulation will decrease as the government’s ability to curb the trade
on its own increases. As noted earlier, fully controlling IRGs requires proper regulation by both
the importing and the exporting countries. However, the greater the capacity of the importing
(exporting) country to control the trade on its side, the less dependent it is on the control by the
exporting (importing) country and the weaker its need for international regulation. By contrast,
countries that cannot control the trade and curtail its negative effects by themselves, for example
On the damage to archaeological sites in India and measures taken by the Indian government
to address the problem, see Ajai Shankar, The Threat to Cultural Sites in India from Illegal
Excavation, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITES, supra note 67, pp. 33-36.
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due to porous borders or dysfunctional law enforcement agencies, are more likely to rely on
international regulation in order to establish controls at the other end. International regulation
allows them to make up for their own regulatory incapacity.
2. Secondary Externalities
For governments facing the negative externalities of the trade, support for international
regulation should be positively correlated with the magnitude of the externalities and their
importance for the public; support should be negatively correlated with the government’s
capacity to curb these externalities on its own. But concern about the negative impact of the trade
is not limited to those governments who face primary externalities. Certain governments,
motivated primarily by values and moral principles, may care about the trade’s negative impact
on foreign countries. I term such value-based concerns secondary externalities, that is, concern
about the externalities borne by countries other than one’s own. In most cases, such caring about
the harm to others has its roots in the humanitarian implications of the goods. Gun proliferation
and conflict diamonds cause large-scale killing and maiming; hazardous wastes spread disease.
Other goods may raise non-humanitarian concerns, such as concern for the protection of cultural
heritage and archaeological knowledge in the case of antiquities. Whatever the reason for
concern, the focus of secondary externalities is the harm to others, rather than any tangible
negative effects on one’s own country.
What fuels secondary externalities? Why is the United States so passionate against human
trafficking worldwide?
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Why is Japan concerned about gun violence in Africa and
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elsewhere? 126 Certain governments have internationalist leaning, worldwide sympathies, and
commitment to welfare abroad. Governments typically adopt such morally-inspired foreign
policy when it has support among elites and mass publics.127 Caring about others, however, is not
entirely selfless. Governments may exhibit concern for foreign countries to improve relations
with them or to gain a better image. For example, one of the motivations underlying the US
support for international antiquities control in the early 1970s was to improve relations with
Latin America128
In yet another set of cases, identifiable groups of principled actors129 place the trade and its
negative effects on the agenda and lobby governments to initiate or participate in an international
regulatory campaign. These groups share a value-based commitment to worldwide suppression
of trade that they deem harmful and repugnant. Such principled actors may be transnational
networks of NGOs. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), initiated by a group
of six NGOs, developed into a network of more than 1,400 groups in over 90 countries.130 The
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) consists of 800 civil society
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organizations in over 100 countries. 131 A coalition of four European NGOs entitled “Fatal
Transactions” launched the campaign against conflict diamonds.132 However, principled actors
could be domestic groups as well. American missionaries induced the United States to try and
solve China’s opium problem in the early 20th century. 133 A century later, diverse American
interest groups convinced the US Government to initiate an international campaign against
human trafficking.
What motivates the principled actors to care about other countries’ problems? In a
minority of cases, the principled actors have a direct stake in addressing these problems by
curbing the harmful trade. For example, American missionaries considered the Chinese opium
problem as an obstacle to their efforts to spread Christianity. 134 In most cases, however,
principled actors are inspired by values and principles rather than by a direct stake. The source of
such values may be religion. The 19th century anti-slavery movement in Britain relied mostly on
a number of Protestant Dissenter sects. In their view, slavery was condemned since it kept the
Africans from achieving salvation and might have resulted in a divine punishment for Britain.135
Religious beliefs also inspire US Evangelical Christians to pursue action against human
trafficking worldwide.136 For other principled actors, motivation comes from a diverse set of
values and goals such as human rights and humanitarianism, peace, development, environmental
protection, and women’s rights. The efforts of the archeological community to promote control
131
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of antiquities are in the interest of knowledge and archaeological heritage.137 In fact, regulatory
campaigns may bring together quite different principled actors. The anti-human trafficking
coalition in the United States, for example, includes feminist, human rights, democracy-building,
and religious organizations.138
Principled actors campaign to make governments care about the welfare of foreign
countries. They advocate the control or elimination of trade they consider reprehensible and
harmful to other nations. Why would governments pay any attention? In a minority of cases,
governments address the concerns of politically powerful principled actors. After the 1832 Great
Reform, Dissenters composed about 21 percent of the British electorate. Often holding the
balance of power between the two major parties, Dissenters brought the government to support
the abolitionist cause and launch a worldwide anti-slavery campaign.139 Similarly, the electoral
power of Evangelical Christians makes their concern about human trafficking an issue of interest
to American politicians. However, the main strategy that principled actors employ involves
educating policy makers and raising their awareness about the trade and its negative
consequences. Education and awareness raising may involve multiple techniques. Groups
seeking to educate US policymakers about human trafficking created and disseminated
educational materials, held conferences that policymakers attended, set up interchanges between
137
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policymakers and victims of trafficking, organized Congressional delegations to other countries,
met with Congress members and staff, testified at Congressional hearings, and voiced their
concerns through the press and letters. 140 To raise awareness about China’s opium problem,
American missionaries met with State Department officials and sent cables and letters to the
President, the State Department, and members of Congress.141
To promote their cause, principled actors may also attempt to educate the public and shape
public opinion. Anti-slavery societies in Britain held public lectures, distributed literature, and
organized several mass petition drives. 142 American missionaries fostered public opinion
sympathetic to China’s problems through missionary and religious journals and through reports
to their churches. 143 The NGO coalition to eliminate conflict diamonds produced numerous
posters and leaflets and called upon the public to ask governments and diamond companies to
establish effective controls. Consumers were encouraged to ask jewelers about the exact source
of the diamonds they were selling.144
What allows the principled actors to educate publics as well as policymakers is their
expertise and knowledge about the trade and its consequences. The dissemination of information
is therefore their key to gaining influence and shaping preferences. At times, information
provision takes the form of a written or filmed report. A 1969 article by archaeologist Clemency
Coggins focused public attention on antiquities looting in Latin America and the role of
American museums in fueling the plunder.145 This exposé, coupled with several media scandals
involving museums, convinced US policymakers to join the international efforts against looting
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despite the opposition of antiquities dealers and some members of the museums community. 146
In 2000 the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research at the University of Cambridge
published Stealing History: The Illicit Trade in Cultural Material. The report provided a
comprehensive survey of the illicit antiquities trade, its effects, and the role played by Britain’s
art market.147 The awareness it created contributed to Britain’s decision to ratify the UNESCO
Convention on cultural property in 2002. Global Witness’s 1998 report A Rough Trade: The Role
of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict exposed publics to the role of diamonds
in funding the Angolan civil war. Two years later Global Witness released Conflict Diamonds:
Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, which included
practical suggestions for the regulation of the diamond trade. In the Kimberley Process,
governments and the diamond industry implemented the suggestion of a certification scheme.148
Although my analysis distinguished between primary and secondary externalities, in
certain situations governments may face both. They may care about the trade’s negative effects
upon their own countries as well as its impact on other countries. France and Germany are
concerned about small arms in Africa that threaten their own soldiers on peacekeeping
operations. At the same time, they worry about the devastating consequences of small arms
proliferation for the African countries. 149 Principled actors may sometimes cast secondary
externalities as primary externalities to bolster their case for action. American missionaries
considered China’s opium problem as a moral evil, but tried to appeal to policymakers by
emphasizing the detrimental effect of opium on US-China trade. 150 Groups interested in
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eliminating human trafficking on moral grounds conceptualized the problem as part of
transnational crime and hence a threat to US national security.151
3. Negative Externalities: Conclusion
Negative externalities are the core distinction between my model of IRGs and conventional trade
models. In conventional trade models, the motivation for regulation is to protect importcompeting sectors; in my model, by contrast, regulation is driven by the negative externalities of
the goods. My model further diverges from conventional trade models by incorporating valuebased concerns – secondary negative externalities. Morally-inspired concerns have in fact
occupied an increasing role in trade policymaking in recent years. The debate over developing
countries’ access to affordable AIDS medications is but one notable example.

152

Yet

conventional trade policy models remain interest-based, failing to capture the growing weight of
normative convictions, values, and moral beliefs in trade policy. Conventional trade models take
into account only material factors such as exporters’ foreign market access, loss of income due to
import-competition, consumers’ economic welfare, and politicians’ pursuit of votes and political
contributions; yet they do not address the influence of humanitarianism or human rights on trade
policy. Conventional models therefore cannot explain why governments may choose to support
international regulation when it brings them no material gains and, furthermore, when regulation
undermines the interests of domestic actors to the benefit of foreign countries. Those puzzles are
resolved by bringing into account value-based concerns, which motivate governments’

Stolz, supra note 138, at 423-424.
See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy
Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA.
L. REV. 727 (2001). On the balance between trade and human rights more generally see SUSAN
ARIEL AARONSON & JANIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE STRUGGLE TO WEIGH
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING (2008).
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participation in international regulatory campaigns to promote welfare and address humanitarian
problems abroad.

D. Predicted Variation in Government Preferences on International Regulation
My theoretical framework has introduced several influences on governments’ preferences: on the
one hand, the interests of exporters and consumers; and on the other hand, primary and
secondary negative externalities of the trade. The weight of these influences will vary across
governments as a function of different variables such as: exporters’ and consumers’ level of
political activity; the magnitude of the trade’s negative effects; and lobbying by principled actors.
Combining the four influences (exporters, consumers, primary externalities, secondary
externalities) along two dimensions, as shown in Figure 2, leads me to predict large variation in
government preferences on international regulation.

Primary/Secondary Negative Externalities
Low
Low
Exporter/ Consumer
Influence
High

I
Weakly-affected
governments

High
II
Pro-regulation
governments

Moderate regulation

III
Anti-regulation
governments

IV
Cross-pressured
governments
Support for regulation varies

Figure 2. Incentives affecting international regulation and expected government preferences
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At one extreme are governments facing large primary or secondary negative externalities and not
facing considerable anti-regulation pressure from exporters or consumers (Quadrant II). These
governments will likely support stringent international regulation, which offers them significant
benefits – curbing the trade’s negative externalities – with little cost. At the other extreme are
governments that have little concern over the trade’s negative effects on their own countries or
on foreign countries, but are strongly influenced by exporters or consumers who push for
uncontrolled trade (Quadrant III). Such governments are unlikely to support international
regulation, which brings them very little benefits in exchange for heavy costs: damage to
exporters or consumers as well as the price of increased law enforcement (for example,
resources required for strengthening customs and border control). Rather than strengthening
control, these governments would prefer its relaxation or elimination.
A third group includes those governments that face low primary or secondary
externalities and no considerable anti-regulation pressure from exporters and consumers
(Quadrant I). These weakly-affected governments have neither strong incentives to support
international regulation nor reasons to oppose it. I expect them to adopt a middle position and
support moderate international regulation. Finally, a fourth group includes cross-pressured
governments (Quadrant IV). On the one hand, primary or secondary negative externalities push
these governments toward supporting international regulation. On the other hand, exporters or
consumers pull them toward unconstrained trade. I expect cross-pressured governments to vary
in their preferences. Their support for international regulation will increase the heavier are the
negative externalities. Support for regulation will decline the greater is the anti-regulation
influence of exporters or consumers.
It is important to note that preferences on international regulation vary across governments
for a particular good; but they may also vary for the same government across different goods. A
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specific constellation of exporters’ and consumers’ influence, coupled with certain negative
externalities, may lead a government to favor tight international regulation of the trade in good X.
A different constellation will lead the same government to oppose regulation of the trade in good
Y. For example, the United States has played a leading role in establishing the international drug
and money laundering regimes. However, the United States has not joined the Basel Convention
on hazardous wastes, nor does it endorse the international regulation of the trade in small
arms.153
Going back to Figure 2, the sharp divergence of preferences predicted by my model is a
major obstacle to an international regulatory agreement. International cooperation typically
builds on joint gains and at least partial convergence of interests among governments.
International regulation, however, involves highly conflicting preferences and little, if any,
common ground. Certain governments benefit from international regulation, which allows them
to address pressing social concerns without imposing significant costs. Other governments,
however, find international regulation highly undesirable. Unconcerned about the trade’s
externalities, they have no need for international control. For them, international control would
only restrict the ability of exporters to make financial gains and the ability of consumers to
obtain the goods. The diametrically opposed preferences of pro-regulation and anti-regulation
governments and the absence of shared interest are the primary obstacles to international
regulation. I now turn to an in-depth examination of how cooperation is nonetheless established.

On the US efforts for international drug control see TAYLOR, supra note 133, DAVID
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNTIONAL DRUG CONTROL, 1909-1997
(1999); On the US efforts against money laundering see Simmons, supra note 19; On the US’
failure to ratify the Basel Convention see Lisa Belenky, Cradle to Border: US Hazardous Waste
Export Regulations and International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 95 (1999). On the US
approach to international small arms regulation see Asif Efrat, Regulating Rifles: International
Control of the Small Arms Trade (February 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
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IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COOPERATION
A. The Cooperation Problem
Conventional analysis of trade cooperation is of limited relevance for the understanding of
cooperation on IRGs. Most obviously, conventional trade agreements and IRG agreements have
opposite goals. Whereas the former aim to lower or dismantle trade barriers and liberalize trade,
the purpose of the latter is to impose restrictions and make trade less free. More fundamentally,
conventional trade and IRGs are entirely different in terms of their underlying incentive structure
and cooperation problem. 154
Scholars have long conceived of trade cooperation as a Prisoners’ Dilemma. 155 In a
bilateral setting, both governments would prefer protection at home and liberalization abroad, but
if the two governments choose protection, the resulting trade war will leave them worse off. By
contrast, if both governments can agree to liberalize trade, both will reap gains. The problem,
however, is the enforcement of such an agreement. Even when governments recognize that trade
liberalization brings welfare gains, they may be tempted to “cheat” by providing protection
contrary to their commitments. Trade agreements facilitate cooperation and assuage concerns
about cheating through various means such as dispute settlement mechanisms and
transparency.156

See Helfer’s definition of a “problem structure” as including “the number of states involved,
their incentives, the strategic interactions they generate, the level of uncertainty, and
asymmetries of information and power. These factors help to predict the difficulty of establishing
and sustaining collective action that improves states’ individual and group welfare in comparison
to the alternatives of unilateral action or no action at all.” Lawrence Helfer, Nonconsensual
International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 98 (2008).
155
See, for example, John Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners’ Dilemmas, and the International
Political Economy, 28 INT’L STUD. Q. 5 (1984); JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-141 (2005); OATLEY, supra note 70, 56-58.
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OATLEY, supra note 70, 60-62.
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Mutual gains motivate trade cooperation. The purpose of trade negotiations and
agreements is to allow all states involved to enjoy the welfare gains of free trade. However,
mutual gains as the rationale of cooperation do not apply to IRGs. As explained above, the major
winners from international regulation are those governments facing negative externalities of the
trade but not pressured by exporters or consumers. International regulation is clearly in the
interest of those governments, helping them to curb the trade’s externalities. Yet for governments
pressured by exporters or consumers without experiencing negative externalities, regulation is
not welfare-enhancing. Rather, international regulation would leave them worse off. As the trade
does not adversely affect them, they do not benefit from international control. From their point of
view, international control would only harm exporters and consumers, who favor uncontrolled
trade. For those governments, the preferred outcome is the absence of international regulation –
in other words, non-cooperation. Figure 3 depicts a payoff structure for the interaction between
pro-regulation and anti-regulation governments.
I illustrate the payoff structure through two examples. Consider the preferences of Somalia
(Government A) and China (Government B) on the regulation of the small arms trade. Somalia
has experienced persistent instability, including civil war, since the 1980s. The Somali
government, interested in preventing militias from obtaining arms, would gain the most from
Regulate/Regulate, wherein the trade is controlled on both ends. Somalia regulates gun import,
distribution, and possession, and China regulates gun export (for instance, avoiding gun sales if
those might lead to instability and conflict). The worst outcome for Somalia is liberalization on
both ends. With Liberalize/Liberalize, there are no restrictions on guns’ import to Somalia or
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Figure 3. Payoff Structure for Pro-regulation and Anti-regulation Governments
Government B (Anti-regulation)
Liberalize

Regulate

Liberalize
Government A
(Pro-regulation)
Regulate

L,L

L,R

R,L

R,R

Preference Orders:
Government A: R,R > R,L > L,R > L,L
Government B: L,L > R,L > L,R > R,R

their export from China, resulting in massive gun proliferation in Somalia. The reverse is true for
China. As a major exporter of small arms interested in market access, China gains the most from
Liberalize/Liberalize. With Liberalize/Liberalize, China is free from restrictions on its exports
and does not meet with import restrictions on Somalia’s side. The worst outcome for China is
Regulate/Regulate, wherein both Chinese export control and Somali import control restrict the
trade. The equilibrium will therefore be R,L – Somalia regulates small arms import and
circulation, whereas China liberalizes exports.
A similar conflict of preferences characterizes the antiquities market. Consider the
preferences of Mexico (Government A) and Switzerland (Government B) on the regulation of
the antiquities trade. As a country suffering significant loss of antiquities, Mexico gains the most
from Regulate/Regulate, wherein Mexican authorities control outflows of antiquities and Swiss
authorities control inflows. Liberalize/Liberalize – free trade in antiquities – is the worst outcome
for Mexico, resulting in depletion of archaeological material. Whereas free movement of
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antiquities is devastating for Mexico, Switzerland – a major art market – would benefit from
unregulated trade. Liberalize/Liberalize would supply Switzerland’s auction houses with
abundance of antiquities, whereas regulation by both Mexico and Switzerland would seriously
disrupt the flow of antiquities and cause financial loss. In equilibrium, Mexico regulates the
exports of antiquities, whereas Switzerland liberalizes imports.
In contrast to conventional trade, the root of the cooperative problem with IRGs is not
incentives to defect; rather, it is the absence of incentives to cooperate in the first place.
Cooperation on IRGs simply does not promise mutual gains. Whereas for some governments
international regulation is very beneficial, for others it is highly undesirable. As the examples
above show, certain governments consider absence of any controls (mutual defection) their
preferred outcome, whereas control on both sides (mutual cooperation) is their worst outcome.
Those governments would choose liberalization regardless of what other governments do. Such
ranking of preferences and the absence of mutual gains from cooperation are very different from
the Prisoners’ Dilemma typical of conventional trade.
IRGs thus involve a more intense conflict than conventional trade. The cornerstone of
conventional trade cooperation is the realization that free trade involves joint gains and could
make all actors better off. The absence of such shared interest is the primary obstacle to
international regulation. Far from reaping gains, cooperation on IRGs may leave certain
countries worse off. To be sure, conventional trade negotiations may be difficult and
acrimonious as well. The unfortunate state of the Doha Round is but one example.157 Yet at their
core, conventional trade talks build on partial convergence of interests, mutual benefits, and at
least a rough consensus on the goal – trade liberalization. These are often absent when
international regulation is on the agenda. In that case, certain governments would favor the nonOn the Doha Round see Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165
(2007).
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cooperative status quo over cooperation. Rather than strengthening control, their preference
would be its relaxation or elimination.
My theory contrasts with much of the literature on international law and cooperation. First,
the above analysis implies that IRG agreements do not provide international public goods. 158
Scholars often view the function of international law as providing public goods at the regional or
global level. International agreements to curb global warming or control pollutants; alliance
treaties and arms control agreements – such agreements and others yield benefits that all states
can enjoy. It is quite tempting to view IRG agreements in a similar fashion and assume that all
states would benefit from such agreements. For example, it seems quite plausible to see major
problems like gun violence, drug addiction, and antiquities looting as public bads which all states
would like to address. Controlling these goods and curbing their negative effects through
international regulation should therefore, presumably, create a public good beneficial to all. Such
view, however, would be entirely erroneous. My analysis suggests that uncontrolled trade in
guns, drugs and antiquities indeed harms certain countries, yet it benefits others. Controlling
these goods internationally would mean welfare gains for those countries bearing the trade’s
externalities; by contrast, control would inflict losses on the countries generating the externalities.
Given that the latter have little to gain and much to lose from international regulation, IRG
agreements do not provide public goods.
At a more general level, absence of mutual gains as an obstacle to cooperation cuts against
the focus of the political science literature on mutually-beneficial cooperation. This focus goes
back to the most seminal work in the early cooperation literature – Keohane’s After Hegemony:
“The difficulties of cooperating are illustrated best not by … purely conflictual games (in which
See, for example, Eric Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 491 (2006); Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 155
(2008).
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discord appears to be determined by the structure of interests) … but by what Thomas Schelling
has called “mixed-motive games”: … both players can benefit from mutual cooperation, but each
can gain more from … ‘defection’.”159 In accordance with this logic, cooperation scholars have
tended to downplay any fundamental conflict in states’ preferences and have usually taken
mutual interest in cooperation as their point of departure. 160 The cooperation literature has
therefore focused on situations where problems of enforcement and monitoring, distributional
issues, or uncertainty impede the realization of mutual gains.161 Many studies have explored the
means that allow states to overcome incentives to cheat or less-than-full information, establish
cooperation, and make themselves better off. Situations that promise no joint gains and involve
no shared interest have received much less attention.162 I now turn to examine how cooperation is
established when the main obstacle is lack of shared interest. I first consider those cases where
weak governments favor cooperation and then the instances where powerful governments favor
cooperation.

KEOHANE, supra note 4, at 67.
Ibid at 6 ( “[After Hegemony] is about how cooperation has been, and can be, organized …
when common interests exist. … The theory that I develop takes the existence of mutual interests
as given and examines the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation.” )
161
See, for example, GEORGE DOWNS AND DAVID ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?
DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995); James
Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INT’L ORG. 269 (1998);
Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761
(2001); Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 549 (2005).
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But see George Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 38 WORLD POL. 118, 123 (1985),
raising “the possibility that Deadlock is far more prevalent than is usually thought to be the
case.” See also Thomas Oately & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure,
Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35 (1998).
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B. Weak Governments Favor Cooperation
IRG agreements do not meet the Pareto condition. 163 While they offer benefits to some
governments, they make others worse off. When those made worse off are powerful
governments, they may simply refuse to join the agreement. Since the weak governments
favoring cooperation have no leverage vis-à-vis the powerful governments that are reluctant to
cooperate, the latter remain outside the agreement.
The governments of China, Russia, India, and Pakistan, have sided with their militaries’
assessments that landmines are a necessity. Considering landmines essential for national security,
they have refused to support a comprehensive ban on landmines.164 The United States has also
recoiled from accepting the landmine prohibition. It recently stated its goal to reduce the
humanitarian risk posed by landmines, but stopped short of accepting the total ban “which would
have required [the United States] to give up a needed military capability.”165 All five countries
have not joined the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of landmines.
The major market countries for antiquities have shown little enthusiasm about the 1970
UNESCO Convention, which asks them to strengthen their control over the movement of
archaeological material and establishes a channel for recovery and return of stolen objects.
Among other market countries, Britain, Germany, and Japan took more than 30 years to ratify
the Convention. 166 None of the three have ratified a second – and more comprehensive –
agreement on antiquities: the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.

An outcome is Pareto optimal when no single actor can be made better off without at the same
time making another actor worse off. See OATLEY, supra note 70, at 58.
164
Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52
INT’L ORG. 613 (1998).
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Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, New United States
Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers
(February 27, 2004), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30044.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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The 1989 Basel Convention was a response to the growing shipment of hazardous wastes
to developing countries, turning them into dumping grounds. This Convention would have
required the United States, the world’s largest exporter of hazardous wastes, to tighten its
restrictions on the export of hazardous waste and broaden the class of wastes subject to control.
The Convention ultimately failed to achieve ratification by the Senate.167
In all three cases above, governments of powerful countries have simply refused to join
agreements that not only offered no gains, but threatened to impose costs on militaries, art
dealers and museums, or industries generating hazardous wastes. In other cases, the conflict of
preferences over regulation was somewhat tempered, as powerful governments identified modest
benefits alongside the large costs of cooperation. In those cases, powerful governments were
slightly cooperative, agreeing to make only small changes to their behavior. They lent their
support to weak international regulation, which was a far cry from the wishes of the proregulation governments. For example, the United States could gain from international small arms
regulation by reducing the risk that gun proliferation poses to American soldiers overseas. At the
same time, international regulation could be harmful to American gun manufacturers; restrict the
ability of the US government to provide arms to its allies; and jeopardize the interests of civilian
gun owners as well. Going back to Figure 2, the United States is therefore a cross-pressured
government with respect to small arms regulation, facing modest pro-regulation incentives and
strong anti-regulation incentives. The United States therefore insisted on an international
regulatory framework for small arms that is not legally binding; includes a very weak
enforcement mechanism; and excludes major issues: regulation of ammunition, restrictions on
arms transfers to non-state actors, and limitations on civilian possession of small arms. This
CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, 1 CULTURAL PROERTY: RETURN AND ILLICIT
TRADE, xx-xxiii (2000).
167
Belenky, supra note 153.
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weak framework – the Program of Action on Small Arms – may bring the United States small
gains without posing a serious threat to its interests. 168 This document, however, does not
effectively address the devastating problem of gun violence in Africa.
In summary, when international regulation benefits weak governments, powerful
governments are either completely uncooperative (if they have nothing to gain) or only slightly
cooperative (if they do identify modest gains). They either do not join the regulatory agreements
or join significantly weakened agreements. In either case, the utility of international regulation is
seriously compromised.

C. Powerful Governments Favor Cooperation
In some cases, international regulation benefits powerful governments to the detriment of weak
governments. In those situations, powerful governments use coercion to make reluctant weak
governments cooperate. Through coercion, “[p]owerful countries can explicitly or implicitly
influence the probability that weaker nations adopt the policy they prefer by manipulating the
opportunities and constraints encountered by target countries… [Coercion] involves power
asymmetries that the strong exploit to impose their policy preferences on weaker countries.”169 In
a small number of cases, IRG-motivated coercion involved the use of military force. Prior to
World War I, Germany and Turkey – both drug exporters – refused to join the international drug
regime. After their military defeat, however, they had to join and implement the Hague Opium
Convention as part of the postwar peace agreements.170 A more contemporary case of military

Efrat, supra note 153.
Simmons et al., supra note 8, 790.
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coercion is the US invasion of Panama and the overthrow of Manuel Noriega. Panama’s
involvement in drug trafficking was among the chief reasons for the invasion.171
While the use of military force to coerce IRG cooperation is rare, the American operation
in Panama is very typical in another respect: the United States as the coercing state. US power
and influence have been necessary for achieving cooperation on some IRGs, since international
regulation requires significant altering of the costs and benefits that anti-regulation governments
face. Anti-regulation governments have little to gain from international regulation, which hurts
exporters and consumers, requires allocation of resources for law enforcement, and does not
yield benefits in return. To overcome the resistance of anti-regulation governments and stimulate
cooperative behavior, non-cooperation has to become very painful. Only powerful external
incentives can compel governments to act against the interests of politically influential domestic
actors and accept international regulation. In the post-World War II era, and even more so after
the Cold War, the United States has had the resources necessary for manipulating governments’
incentives so as to coerce cooperation on IRGs. The United States exerts IRG-motivated
coercion bilaterally and through international institutions. Coercion takes two forms: the first,
economic coercion, is a well established tool of statecraft;172 the second and more innovative tool
is reputational coercion – the intentional tarnishing of countries’ reputation through blacklisting.

1. Economic Coercion
To force acceptance of international regulation, the United States exerts economic coercion
through withholding of aid, trade measures, and other financial tools. Such means affect
A Transcript of President Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1989.
172
See, for example, DAVID BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (1985); LISA MARTIN,
COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992); Daniel
Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 INT’L ORG. 643 (2003).
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governments’ calculations by escalating the economic costs of non-cooperation or the benefits of
cooperation. Once governments realize they gain more from cooperation than from noncooperation, they have an economic motivation to join the international regulatory efforts.
The use of economic coercion has been an integral part of the US War on Drugs. In 1969
President Nixon forced Mexico to tackle marijuana and heroin production through a two-week
closure of the US-Mexico border (Operation Intercept). The resulting massive disruption to trade
convinced Mexican authorities to confront the drug issue.173 In the mid-1980s the United States
formalized and systematized the use of economic coercion with the introduction of the Narcotics
Certification Process. This Process involves the submission of an annual presidential report to
Congress. In the report, known as the “Majors List”, the President identifies all major illicit drug
producing countries and major drug-transit countries; certifies those countries that have taken
appropriate anti-drug measures, especially those required by the 1988 UN Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs; and designates those countries that have ”failed demonstrably”
to make substantial efforts toward taking the required measures. Countries found to have “failed
demonstrably” face a series of penalties, among them withholding of fifty percent of nonhumanitarian aid and a mandatory “no” vote by the United States on loans from six multilateral
development banks.174 US coercion proved effective for the Andean strategy in the early 1990s.
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru – at first reluctant to embrace increased US military involvement in
their anti-drug efforts – succumbed to American demands under the threat of aid withdrawal.175
The use of economic coercion to compel IRG cooperation is not limited to drugs. Annual
blacklists also identify non-cooperative countries on money laundering, human trafficking, and
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note153, at 199-200.
See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291h-2291j. The President’s determination
of the Majors List is based on the annual State Department’s International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR). Volume I of the INCSR addresses drug and chemical control activities.
The Reports are available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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intellectual property, resulting in possible penalties. Countries designated by the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) as non-cooperative on money laundering could face countermeasures with serious financial consequences. 176 The USA PATRIOT ACT authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to take similar measures against countries considered “of primary
money laundering concern.”177 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act requires
governments to meet minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking and threatens
to withhold US aid from governments that do not comply with those standards or make
significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.178 Countries that fail to provide adequate
protection of intellectual property rights may face US trade sanctions under Section 301 of the
Trade Act.179

2. Reputational Coercion
Governments feel the impact of being blacklisted through their pocket. Penalties resulting from
inclusion on a blacklist, such as aid withdrawal or trade sanctions, impose direct material costs.
176

Key among those counter-measures is a recommendation to financial institutions to “give
special attention to business relationships and transactions with … countries which do not or
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If those costs overwhelm the benefits of non-cooperation, reluctant governments will likely
accept international regulation. However, direct economic penalties are not the only outcome of
blacklisting. Countries designated as non-cooperative by the United States (or FATF) may suffer
a serious blow to their reputation as well.180 Tier 3 Countries in the State Department Trafficking
in Persons Report (countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of human trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do
so); Priority Foreign Countries in the USTR Special 301 Report on intellectual property
(countries with “the most onerous and egregious acts, policies, and practices which have the
greatest adverse impact … on the relevant U.S. products [and are] not engaged in good faith
negotiations … to address these problems”); “Countries of Primary Concern” in the State
Department report on money laundering; 181 and countries identified by the President to have
“failed demonstrably” in meeting their counter-narcotics obligations; all receive bad labels that
tarnish their reputation.
“Naming and Shaming” those who violate standards of appropriate behavior is not a
unique American tactic, of course. Shaming is also one of the popular means in the arsenal of the
NGO community. NGOs often attempt to exert pressure on violators of human rights through
negative media publicity.182 Shaming by NGOs, however, fails to achieve the desired effect on
state practice in most cases. As Hafner-Burton shows, bad publicity by itself involves low costs,

I use the term reputation in the sense of global standing or popular perception of the state with
a global audience, rather than reputation for compliance. On the distinction between the two see
Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation (November 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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and rarely hurts enough to stimulate reforms.183 I argue that shaming through US blacklisting is
more coercive in nature and more likely to be effective than NGO shaming through negative
media publicity. US (and FATF) blacklists have greater coercive impact due to their
authoritativeness, institutionalization, and conditionality.
Blacklists carry significant weight since their source – the US Government or an
international organization (FATF) – is widely considered to be authoritative. Unlike NGOcriticized governments, blacklisted governments cannot simply brush off the United States
rebuke as coming from a marginal or extremist source. The status of the United States as the sole
superpower reflects on the condemnations it issues against governments failing to meet standards
of appropriate behavior. Since their source is the US Government, such condemnations are more
likely to receive attention and serious consideration. They are more likely to be seen by
audiences worldwide as credible judgments of governments’ conduct.
The institutionalization of US (and FATF) blacklists is another factor contributing to their
reputational impact. Blacklists are prepared and published annually. They are the result of
systematic review processes with worldwide coverage, relying on multiple sources of
information. The comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the review processes endows
blacklists with legitimacy. With global coverage and the inclusion of US allies on the lists,
criticized governments cannot simply denounce blacklists as ill-motivated targeting of US foes.
As they are backed by detailed evidence, blacklists are difficult to dismiss as unfounded
accusations. Moreover, continuous monitoring on an annual basis raises the pressure by
constantly reminding audiences about the failure of non-cooperative governments to improve
their conduct. An institutionalized process is therefore much more harmful to governments’
reputation than occasional negative press coverage.
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Finally, the conditional nature of blacklists magnifies incentives for cooperation by
rewarding improved behavior and penalizing deteriorating behavior. US blacklists are based on
clear and explicit standards of good conduct. They identify particular faults in governments’
behavior and make specific demands for addressing them. Governments are aware that meeting
those demands will result in a better ranking, whereas continued failure to meet the requirements
could diminish their standing. For instance, the State Department rewards Tier 2 countries that
make progress in combating human trafficking by moving them up to Tier 1. Persistent lack of
progress or worsening record, on the other hand, could move Tier 2 countries down to Tier 2
Watch List and even Tier 3. The implied threat and promise combined with clear and specific
requirements offer governments more powerful incentives than critical media coverage.
Governments who know precisely what is expected of them and can see immediate results to
their efforts through better ranking have stronger motivation for cooperation.
Similar to economic coercion, tarnished reputation may influence governments through
negative material consequences. For example, Colombia’s decertification in 1997 due to
insufficient efforts to control drug traffickers unsettled the economy and deterred much needed
foreign investment. 184 Reputational coercion, however, may also affect governments through
various mechanisms that do not involve a direct manipulation of cost/benefit calculations.
Policymakers may be psychologically motivated “to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace
that commonly befalls those who break widely accepted rules.”185 The opprobrium associated
with norm breaking may cause them cognitive discomfort and a blow to self-esteem.
Governments interested in maintaining their international status and prestige may wish to avoid
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being blacklisted; the same for governments concerned about the impact of negative reputation
on their domestic legitimacy.186
As explained earlier, the magnitude of such non-material effects, and hence their coercive
impact, are larger for US blacklists than for other forms of shaming. In fact, governments may be
more concerned about the reputational effects of blacklists than about their immediate material
implications. Although the United States threatens to withdraw aid from countries ranked as Tier
3 by the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, Israeli officials have considered aid
withdrawal unlikely. For them, the primary consequence of Israel’s Tier 3 ranking in the 2001
Report was reputational. The US blacklist seriously hindered Israel’s efforts to foster the positive
image of a country that respects human rights. In an attempt to rehabilitate its good name, Israel
stepped up the efforts against human trafficking and advanced to Tier 2 the following year.187

D. Cooperation in Time
The use of coercion to establish cooperation involves “manipulating the opportunities and
constraints encountered by target countries.”188 If anti-regulation governments find that the costs
of non-cooperation exceed its benefits, they will cooperate. Coercion, however, does not change
their underlying preference. Free from coercion, they would still oppose international regulation.
Unlike coercion, time may bring about actual change in preferences on international
regulation. First, government change may lead to preference change. Government’s preference is
the result of balancing the negative externalities of the trade with pressure from exporters and
consumers. A new government in power may weigh the competing influences differently than
the previous one and strike a different balance. For example, the Labor government that assumed
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office in Britain in 1997 adopted a more morally-inspired foreign policy than its predecessor.
Whereas the damage caused by the antiquities trade to developing countries was not a concern
for the Conservative government, the Labor government found the looting of antiquities more
troubling. In other words, antiquities became a source of secondary negative externalities for the
Labor government. Additionally, the Labor government was less protective of the interests of the
art market than the previous government. Caring about the negative externalities of antiquities
and less committed to consumers, the Labor government was willing to accept international
regulation of the antiquities trade and ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention on cultural
property in 2002.189
Preferences may also shift as a result of changes in the external environment. Negative
externalities that were initially small may increase enough to overwhelm the anti-regulation
influence of exporters and consumers. Governments that previously faced only pressure from
exporters or consumers without negative externalities, may become cross-pressured. The Chinese
government favored weak protection of intellectual property rights as long as China had only
benefits to reap from the sale of pirated and counterfeit goods. Yet with the modernization of
recent years, Chinese companies started suffering losses from trademark and copyright
infringement. Accordingly, China has become more cooperative on IPRs and has been
undertaking a significant reform of its intellectual property laws.190
Another change in time that may affect non-cooperative governments is broad
international acceptance of regulation. Once a large number of countries have come to embrace
international regulation, it becomes difficult to maintain an uncompromising anti-regulation
position. Why is this the case? Finnemore and Sikkink focus on international socialization
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processes that result from wide endorsement of a new norm. They argue that widespread norm
adoption exerts peer pressure that affects the legitimation, conformity, and esteem of norm
violators. 191 I suggest that broad acceptance of international regulation can also translate to
domestic pressures on governments to cooperate. International antiquities regulation is a case in
point. By the late 1990s, the 1970 UNESCO Convention achieved about 90 ratifications. The
growing adherence to the Convention and efforts of source countries to promote further
acceptance raised awareness in market countries to the problem of looted antiquities. As a result,
media exposure of unscrupulous conduct by art market actors in Britain generated public outcry.
This, in turn, contributed to the British government’s willingness to adopt a more cooperative
position and join the Convention.192

V. CONCLUSION
Free trade is one of the most important principles of the world economy. Accordingly, the trade
literature has been focusing on the lowering of trade barriers and facilitation of commerce. This
paper, in turn, emphasizes the exact opposite: restrictions and prohibitions on potentially harmful
trade. My theory brings under one framework cooperative arrangements from different issueareas and emphasizes the underlying political conflict that they share. This conflict originates
from the wide preference gap between anti-regulation governments that benefit from
uncontrolled trade and pro-regulation governments interested in curbing the trade’s externalities.
As I explained above, the source of these conflicting preferences is in the domestic political
arena, where the public, exporters, consumers, and civil society all shape governments’ positions.
Another important aspect of my theory is the integration of rationalist and non-rationalist
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approaches to international law. Governments in my theory respond to material influences, such
as exporters’ and consumers’ pressure, yet they may also have value-based concerns for the
welfare of foreign countries.
My analysis has focused on the sharp divergence of government preferences as the
primary obstacle to international regulation. Preference divergence, however, is not the only
obstacle to the international efforts against problems like gun violence or antiquities looting.
Lack of capacity may also hinder these efforts. Many developing countries simply do not have
enough resources to enforce their laws fully, guard their borders effectively, or detect and seize
the relevant goods. Even in developed countries those goods often elude customs inspection.
Another impediment is uncertainty. Information about smuggling routes or the operations of
traffickers, for example, is difficult to gather. Finally, international cooperation between law
enforcement agencies faces multiple obstacles, such as incompatibility of national databases and
inadequate information exchange. And yet the key problems are the large variation in national
preferences over international regulation and the reluctance of certain governments to address the
trade’s externalities. When common interest exists, governments can work together to enhance
capacity and overcome uncertainty. Yet if certain governments identify only costs and no gains
from international regulation; if the linchpin of cooperation – shared interest – is absent; joint
international action becomes infinitely more difficult to establish.
What are the policy implications of the theory? As I have explained above, powerful
governments interested in regulation can overcome the problem of preference divergence
through coercion. Employing coercion, however, is not an option for weak governments wishing
to promote international regulation. Those governments may find that the global regulatory
agreement fails to meet their needs, either because the powerful governments generating the
externalities have not joined it or because the agreement has been watered down considerably to
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allow the powerful governments to join. When this is the case, weak governments can focus on
bolstering national controls as well as strengthening regional cooperation, where consensus is
more easily achieved than at the global level. Consider small arms, for example. National and
regional regulation of small arms may be the only viable option for the African countries, given
that the primary global framework – the Program of Action on Small Arms – fails to provide an
adequate response to the scourge of gun violence. National and regional efforts, however, are
only a second-best solution. An effective response to the problem of trade externalities must
involve the externalities-generating countries and tackle the externalities at their source. National
or regional efforts that do not address the source of the externalities cannot therefore fully
substitute for global regulation. An alternative solution would entail awareness-raising activities
intended to educate publics and policymakers about the harmful effects of uncontrolled trade.
Fostering concern about the trade’s impact abroad (secondary externalities) may ultimately lead
anti-regulation governments to reverse their position.
In addition to policy implications, my study has theoretical implications for three bodies of
literature. First, my analysis suggests that trade policy preferences are shaped by a larger variety
of influences than the trade literature has acknowledged. Interest groups demands are at the heart
of conventional trade policy models, and consumers’ welfare figures into governments’
calculations as well. My theoretical framework has introduced additional influences on trade
policy: the negative effects of the trade on society, value-based concerns, and the government’s
own interest as exporter or consumer. These influences, in particular value-based motivations,
should become an integral part of trade policy analysis. As human rights issues become closely
linked with trade, 193 trade policy models can no longer be based solely on material factors,
without taking into account values and moral views. Both dimensions – material and value-based
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concerns – shape many of the contemporary debates over trade, and if our theoretical lens
remains focused on the former and insensitive to the latter, we are bound to miss an important
part of the picture.
Second, my analysis suggests that coercion plays an important role in stimulating
normative change.194 Constructivists acknowledge that coercion is indeed a mechanism of social
influence and that spreading norms may require the use of punishments and rewards. 195 Yet
Constructivist analysis privileges a different social mechanism: persuasion – “changing minds,
opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or
mental coercion.” 196 As Johnston observes, the “focus on persuasion … [is] what really
distinguishes [constructivists] from neorealists or contractual institutionalists.”197 My theoretical
framework, however, demonstrated that coercion may play an important role in norm promotion.
Backed by American power and influence, the norms against drugs, money laundering and
counterfeiting/piracy have gained wide adherence. Norms that did not enjoy American support,
such as those on small arms and landmines, have achieved far less success. Analysis of
normative change must therefore take into account coercive – in addition to persuasive –
mechanisms.
Finally, this paper has implications for the international law and cooperation literature at
large. The explanation for the difficulties in cooperation on small arms, drugs, or antiquities is
not any of those typically offered by the literature. The main obstacle in all these cases is not
incentives to cheat, a collective action problem, or uncertainty; rather, it is the absence of shared
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interest. When certain governments face a massive gun or drug problem while others make profit
by supplying these goods, there is little common ground. The primary difficulty is therefore the
highly conflicting preferences of governments and the large gap between governments that
benefit considerably from international regulation and those that stand to lose. We risk
overlooking this major obstacle if we follow much of the literature and take the mutual gains
assumption as the premise of our analysis. Assuming that a treaty benefits all governments
would prevent us from realizing that for certain governments a treaty may mean costs and no
gains. The general theoretical point is therefore that mutual gains and shared interest should be
problematized, rather than assumed. Analysis of discord should not begin by asking why states
failed to capture joint gains. Instead, the starting point should be: Are there any joint gains to
capture? Collective action problems can impede cooperation and so can uncertainty, but at times
the obstacle is more fundamental. Different states may simply want very different things.
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